Guest lectures and workshops

Hydrogen and synthetic energy carriers: new value chains and the future of global energy trade

Kiel Institute Research Seminar:
Speaker:
Veronika Grimm (Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg (FAU), German Council of Economic Experts)
Time and Date: Tuesday, August 3, 12.30 -13.30h

Abstract:

Hydrogen and synthetic energy carriers will play a central role in an increasingly climate-friendly economy. The wide range of technologies and components required for hydrogen use holds the opportunity for Germany and Europe to leverage substantial value creation potential through the production of key components for the hydrogen economy as well as through the development of new value chains. On the other hand, the switch to climate-friendly energy production shifts international locational advantages. This potentially shifts value chains, but also affects global energy trade. In my presentation, I will shed light on these developments building on a series of working papers (&work in progress) that address the future role of hydrogen from different perspectives.

Further information:
Online via Zoom
If interested, please send an Email to 
frank.bickenbach@ifw-kiel.de to receive a Zoom link to the seminar
Research Seminar homepage: 
Research Seminar (ifw-kiel.de)

Reform Chatter and Democracy

Kiel Institute Research Seminar:
Speaker:
Rabah Arezki (African Development Bank; Harvard Kennedy School of Government)
Time and Date: Tuesday, June 15, 12.30 -13.30h

Abstract:
This paper explores the dynamics of media chatter about economic reforms using text analysis from about a billion newspaper articles in 28 languages. The paper shows that the intensity of reform chatter increases during economic downturns. This increase is more significant in democracies. Using instrumental variable techniques, the analysis finds the relationship to be causal. The paper also documents that reform chatter is followed by actual reforms, suggesting that democracies benefit from a “self-correcting” mechanism stemming from changing popular attitudes toward reform.

Further information:
Online via Zoom
If interested, please send an Email to 
frank.bickenbach@ifw-kiel.de to receive a Zoom link to the seminar
Research Seminar homepage: 
Research Seminar (ifw-kiel.de)

Africa's Latent Assets

Kiel Institute Research Seminar:
Speaker: Soeren J. Henn (Innovations for Poverty Action and University of Chicago)
Time and Date: Tuesday, June 8, 12.30 -13.30h

Abstract:

Despite the past centuries' economic setbacks and challenges, are there reasons for optimism about Africa's economic prospects? We provide a conceptual framework and empirical evidence that show how the nature of African society has led to three sets of unrecognized "latent assets." First, success in African society is talent driven and Africa has experienced high levels of perceived and actual social mobility. A society where talented individuals rise to the top and optimism prevails is an excellent basis for entrepreneurship and innovation. Second, Africans, like westerners who built the world's most successful effective states, are highly skeptical of authority and attuned to the abuse of power. We argue that these attitudes can be a critical basis for building better institutions. Third, Africa is "cosmopolitan." Africans are the most multilingual people in the world, have high levels of religious tolerance, and are welcoming to strangers. The experience of navigating cultural and linguistic diversity sets Africans up for success in a globalized world.

Further information:
Online via Zoom
If interested, please send an Email to 
frank.bickenbach@ifw-kiel.de to receive a Zoom link to the seminar
Research Seminar homepage: 
Research Seminar (ifw-kiel.de)

Mentoring and Schooling Decisions: Causal Evidence

Kiel Institute Research Seminar:
Speaker: Pia Pinger (University of Cologne, briq, IZA)
Time and Date: Tuesday, June 1, 12.30 -13.30h

Abstract:

Inequality of opportunity strikes when two children with the same academic performance are sent to different quality schools because their parents differ in socio-economic status. Based on a novel dataset for Germany, we demonstrate that children are significantly less likely to enter the academic track if they come from low socio-economic status (SES) families, even after conditioning on prior measures of school performance. We then provide causal evidence that a low-intensity mentoring program can improve long-run education outcomes of low SES children and reduce inequality of opportunity. Low SES children, who were randomly assigned to a mentor for one year are 20 percent more likely to enter a high track program. The mentoring relationship affects both parents and children and has positive long-term implications for children's educational trajectories.– From China's boycotts, Turkish or Russian threats, to U.S. financial sanctions: The EU and its member states increasingly face economic coercion from China and sometimes even from allies.

Further information:

Online via Zoom
If interested, please send an Email to 
frank.bickenbach@ifw-kiel.de to receive a Zoom link to the seminar
Research Seminar homepage: 
Research Seminar (ifw-kiel.de)

Strengthening Europe against Economic Coercion – policy options for European economic sovereignty

Kiel Institute Research Seminar:
Speaker: Jonathan Hackenbroich (European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR))
Time and Date: Tuesday, May 18, 12.30 -13.30h

Abstract:
– From China's boycotts, Turkish or Russian threats, to U.S. financial sanctions: The EU and its member states increasingly face economic coercion from China and sometimes even from allies.
– A whole series of states, whose economic weight is increasing, are deeply intertwining economics and geopolitics with the possibility of weaponising economic dependencies
– The European Union and its member states have few tools to counter economic coercion. The EU's vulnerability threatens its sovereignty and economic openness.
– ECFR has brought together a high-level task force of representatives from the public, private and financial sectors mainly from Germany and France, to analyze 11 instruments and policy options to protect, defend, and enhance European sovereignty in the geo-economic sphere, looking at merits and difficulties that each of them entails.
– The mere existence of such instruments could have a deterrent effect on third countries. Such instruments might therefore be necessary to preserve the EU's economic openness and defend the rules-based international order. But where is the line beyond which the EU itself becomes protectionist and risks fueling a development toward economic warfare instead of deterring it

Further information:

Online via Zoom
If interested, please send an Email to 
frank.bickenbach@ifw-kiel.de to receive a Zoom link to the seminar
Research Seminar homepage: 
Research Seminar (ifw-kiel.de)

Erich Schneider - Gedächtnisvorlesung

You will find the invitation to the Eric Schneider memorial lecture here.
It will take place in form of a webinar.


Monday, April  19th, 2021
6 pm to 7:30 pm.
online via Zoom (
link)

The lecture will be given by:

Professor Dr. Till Requate
Kiel University,
Institute of Economics

»Das Gutachten der Expertenkommission für Forschung und Innovation 2021: Agiler Staat, digitale Weiterbildung, Genschere (CRISPR/Cas)«

We would be pleased to welcome you at the memorial lecture.

The lecture will be given in German language!

Decoupling Global Value Chains

KCG Lunch-time Seminar:
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Peter Eppinger (University of Tübingen)
Time and Date: Friday, April 16, 12.00 -13.00h
Abstract:

The supply chain contagion sparked by the Covid-19 pandemic has brought an important question to the forefront of the policy debate: Can cutting global value chains (GVCs) benefit a country by shielding it from foreign shocks? Using a quantitative trade model we find that shutting down GVCs causes substantial welfare losses in all countries. In this counterfactual world without GVCs, the international repercussions of a Covid-19 shock in China are reduced on average, but magnified in some countries. A unilateral repatriation of all GVCs by the U.S. would reduce national welfare by 1.6% but barely change U.S. exposure to a foreign shock. More generally, we find across a wide range of scenarios that the reduction in shock exposure due to decoupling does not compensate the direct welfare costs

Further information:
Online via Zoom
If interested, please send an Email to 
kcg-conference@ifw-kiel.de to receive an access link to the seminar.
KCG Lunch Time Seminar webpage: 
https://www.kcg-kiel.org/kcg-research-seminar-2021/

Trade Shocks, Labour Markets and Elections in the First Globalization

KCG Lunch Time Seminar:
Speaker:
Felix Kersting (HU Berlin)
Time and Date: Friday, March 12, 2021, 12:00 – 13:00

Abstract:

We study the “grain invasion” of the first globalization (1880-1913) as a historical counterpart to today’s China shock. We show that trade shocks in agriculture depressed rural counties in Prussia. However, we do not find the decline in income per capita and the political polarization that studies find for today’s trade shock. Instead, workers left affected counties in large numbers. Our results suggest that the negative and persistent effects of trade shocks we see today are not a universal feature of trade integration, but depend on labor mobility, too. For our analysis, we combine data from three industrial and agricultural censuses on the county level with national trade data at the product level. For causal identification, we instrument German trade exposure with trade exposure for Italy.

Further information:

Online Seminar
If interested, please send an Email to 
kcg-conference@ifw-kiel.de to receive an access link to the seminar.
KCG Lunch Time Seminar webpage: 
https://www.kcg-kiel.org/kcg-research-seminar-2021/

 

 

 

Do Scientists Tell the Truth? Global Experimental Evidence

Kiel Institute Research Seminar:
Speaker: Menusch Khadjavi (Kiel Institute and  Free University Amsterdam)
Time and Date: Tuesday, March 9, 12.30 -13.30h

Abstract:

Academic honesty is crucial for the advancement of and trust in science. Meanwhile, there are concerns around a so-called replication crisis and survey evidence reveals non-negligible questionable research practices. Motivated by identity economics theory, we provide evidence on scientists’ truth-telling by means of two online experiments. We employ an established coin-tossing task with more than 1,300 scientists, in which scientists face a trade-off between monetary incentives for lying and honest reporting. Specifically, we compare reporting behavior between two treatments, either making the private or professional identity salient. In Experiment I with 437 mostly European and North American marine scientists, we find that fewer scientists over-report winning tail tosses in the professional identity treatment. In Experiment II with 864 scientists from diverse academic disciplines and world regions, we find heterogeneous effects across groups and do not replicate the main result from Experiment I invariably. While we replicate the effect for North American scientists, we find the opposite for Southern European and East Asian scientists. Our data significantly correlates with existing country-specific (dis)honesty data. Our findings highlights the importance of professional and societal honesty norms to curb misconduct.

Further information:

Online via GoToMeeting
If interested, please send an Email to 
frank.bickenbach@ifw-kiel.de to receive a GoToMeeting link to the seminar
Research Seminar homepage: 
Research Seminar (ifw-kiel.de)

Jumpstarting an international currency

Kiel Institute Research Seminar:
Speaker: Saleem Bahaj (Bank of England)

Time and Date: Tuesday, February 23, 12.30 -13.30h

Abstract:

Monetary and financial policies that lower the cost of credit for working capital in a currency outside of its country can provide the impetus for that currency to be used in international trade. This paper shows this in theory, by exploring the complementarity in the currency used for financing working capital and the currency used for invoicing sales. Financial policies by a central bank can jump-start the use of its currency outside a country’s borders. In the data, the creation of 38 swap lines by the People’s Bank of China between 2009 and 2018 provides a test of the theory. Signing a swap line with a country is significantly associated with increases in the use of the RMB in payments to and from that country in the following months.

Further information:

Online via GoToMeeting
If interested, please send an Email to 
frank.bickenbach@ifw-kiel.de to receive a GoToMeeting link to the seminar
Research Seminar homepage: 
Research Seminar (ifw-kiel.de)

Tough bargains: When cooperation is more competitive than competition

Kiel Institute Research Seminar:
Speaker: Joachim Henkel (Technical University of Munich)

Time and Date: Tuesday, February 16, 12.30 -13.30h
Abstract:

Economic agents frequently take long-term actions, regarding for instance investments in cost reduction or R&D, before engaging in more short-term interactions, e.g. through price setting. Those short-term interactions may be noncooperative as for example competition on a consumer market, or cooperative and based on negotiations. With cooperation, agents generally achieve the collectively optimal outcome, conditional on the long-term actions taken earlier, since they can agree on and contractually fix their actions. The preceding long-term decisions, however, are typically not subject to joint optimization. This raises the question of how they differ if players anticipate cooperation compared to the case that they anticipate competition. Can it happen that agents prepare more aggressively for cooperation than for competition, and thus destroy some of the value they create through cooperation? And if so, under what conditions? To address these questions, I analyze two-stage duopoly games in which agents move noncooperatively in Stage 1, followed by either noncooperative or cooperative moves in Stage 2. In the latter case, a biform game, agents bargain in Stage 2 over how to divide the joint payoff. I show that Stage-1 actions can be more competitive in preparation of cooperation than in preparation of noncooperative interaction, in the sense of deviating more from the benchmark of full collusion in both stages, and derive conditions for this to be the case. For instance, duopolists selling substitutive goods in price competition invest more in cost reduction when preparing for cooperation than when preparing for price competition. Such increased investments can be wasteful for the duopolists and for society. My results also suggest that economic actors should pay attention to the pre-negotiation phase when arranging cooperation talks.

Further information:

Online via GoToMeeting
If interested, please send an Email to 
frank.bickenbach@ifw-kiel.de to receive a GoToMeeting link to the seminar

Research Seminar homepage: Research Seminar (ifw-kiel.de)

 

Covert Racism in Economics

Kiel Institute Research Seminar:
Speaker: 
John Komlos (University of Munich, Professor Emeritus)
Time and Date:  Tuesday, February 9, 16.00 -17.00
Abstract:

The mainstream economic theory is replete with implications that feed into structural racism inasmuch as it has the unintended consequence of severely disadvantaging people at the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum which in the U.S. includes a disproportionate number of Hispanics, Indigenous people, and those whose ancestors were slaves. Economic theory thereby provides justification for preserving the status quo and thereby becomes covertly racist because the assumptions upon which it rests handicaps minorities. For example, the canon assumes that information is free, whereas it is not, and costly information implies that its acquisition by poor people requires a greater share of their income, making it more difficult for them to make well-informed decisions. Because of inferior schooling opportunities, the poor are more exposed to the myriad of problems associated with bounded rationality and have difficulties avoiding the traps set for them in small print. That tastes are assumed to be exogenous is hardly a benign oversight, because people enter the market as children; so, unfettered markets have a long time to impact their character. This has a harsh effect especially on poor children since they are particularly vulnerable to influence through advertisements. Opportunistic behavior means that people with better information can take advantage of others in an immoral, unprincipled, cunning, crafty, or deceptive manner. Because of less information at their disposal and because of inferior schooling, minorities are more exposed to the vagaries of unscrupulous and powerful megacorporations that often leads to exploitation. Conventional economic theory, in the main, ignores these crucial issues and instead theorizes about an Alice-in-Wonderland economy inhabited by supermen and superwomen who know everything about everything, are perfectly rational, develop their tastes autonomously, can maximize their welfare, have perfect foresight, and avoid falling prey to opportunists around them. Hence, mainstream economists provide succor for the maintenance of the status quo which tilts the lever of opportunities away from minorities and supports systemic racism as a consequence.

Further information:

Online via GoToMeeting
If interested, please send an Email to 
frank.bickenbach@ifw-kiel.de to receive a GoToMeeting link to the seminar
Research Seminar homepage: 
Research Seminar (ifw-kiel.de)

A Quantitative Analysis of the Terms-of-Trade Theory

Kiel Institute Research Seminar:
Speaker:
 Marcos Ritel (Kühne Logistics University – KLU)

Time and Date:  Tuesday, February 2, 12.30 -13.30
Abstract:

I evaluate whether predictions of the terms-of-trade theory, the leading argument in Economics on the formation of trade treaties, are consistent with the data. The theory says that trade agreements help governments internalize a terms-of-trade externality that arises from exploiting market power. I ask what import tariffs countries would choose if they set trade policy exclusively with this purpose. Motivated by empirical evidence on tariffs, I pursue this goal in the context of a quantitative gravity model that captures non-cooperative and partially cooperative behavior among countries in a theory-consistent way. I check whether its predictions can be brought in line with observed tariffs of members and non-members of the World Trade Organization.

Further information:

Online via GoToMeeting
If interested, please send an Email to 
frank.bickenbach@ifw-kiel.de to receive a GoToMeeting link to the seminar
Research Seminar homepage: 
Research Seminar (ifw-kiel.de)

Provision of public goods via unilateral but mutually conditional commitments - mechanism, equilibria, and learning

Monday, January 11th, we will welcome the first speaker in 2021 in our Erich-Schneider-Seminar

Speaker: Jobst Heitzig (PIK)

Time: 04:15 PM

Considering that players may be unable to write binding agreements but may make binding unilateral commitments that are conditonal on other´s actions, we study a mechanism based on conditional commitiment functions (CCFs). If players must choose their CCFs once and simultaneously, the mechanism contributes to the Nash program since its strong (or coaliton-proof) equilibria realize precisely the core outcomes of the corresponding bargaining problem. If players can communicate, the outcome can thus be expected to be Pareto-efficient. Even without communication, the core outcomes may be found by simple individual learning rules. We motivate the idea in a Cournot duopoly and a public good problem and then derive our results in a very general decision-theoretic framework and give further examples from different areas of economics. 
 

Ref.: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3449004

 

Please use this link to participate via Zoom: https://uni-kiel.zoom.us/j/86854483127

Right and Yet Wrong: A Spatio-Temporal Evaluation of Germany's COVID-19 Containment Policy

Speaker: Prof. Dr. Michael Berlemann - Politische Ökonomik und Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung - HSU Hamburg

07.12.2020 - 16:15-17:30

In order to get the COVID-19 pandemic under control, most governments around the globe have adopted some sort of containment policies. In the light of the enormous costs of these policies, in many countries highly controversial discussions on the adequacy of the chosen policies evolved. We contribute to this discussion by evaluating three waves of containment measures adopted by the German government. Based on a spatio-temporal endemic-epidemic model we show that in retrospective, only the first wave of containment measures clearly contributed to flattening the curve of new infections. However, a real-time analysis using the same empirical model reveals that based on the then available information, the adoption of additional containment measures was warranted. Moreover our spatio-temporal analysis shows that a one-size-fits-all policy, as it was adopted in Germany on the early stages of the epidemic, is not optimal.

Online-Vortrag: https://uni-kiel.zoom.us/j/82900759878

Kiel Institute Research Seminar: Gender and Political Coalitions

Speaker: Manuel Bagues (University of Warwick)

Time and Date: December 8, 12.30 -13.30

Abstract:

Women are generally under-represented in top positions in the labor market, and it is largely documented that the gender gap in professional careers widens as the seniority of the position increases. In this paper we study one potential explanation for the "leaky pipeline", namely gender differences in success at forming coalitions in male-dominated environments. We use data from municipal elections in Spain, where municipal councils choose the mayor among list-leaders by majority rule, after a general election to select the council members. We study gender-mixed close elections between 1999 and 2019 and show that female leaders that gain the plurality of votes in the general election are significantly less likely to lead a government coalition than male leaders with the same electoral support. The gender difference is specific to elections where no party wins a seat advantage, is not accounted for by differences in party affiliation or political experience, and is larger the higher the share of men involved in the bargaining. Preliminary evidence from a similar institutional setup in Czech Republic confirms these findings. Our findings might be relevant in contexts where a group elects its head (e.g. government assemblies or corporate boards). More generally, since group support and alliances are arguably crucial to lead a hierarchical organization, our findings indicate that lower success in securing group support and alliances is a potential contributor to women's scarcity in top positions.

Further information:

Online via GoToMeeting
If interested, please send an Email to frank.bickenbach@ifw-kiel.de to receive a GoToMeeting link to the seminar
Research Seminar homepage: Research Seminar (ifw-kiel.de)

Vortrag zu Plattformstrategien von Daniel Krauss (Gründer von Flixbus)

Titelbild des Vortrags zu Plattformstrategien

Der Aufbau eines #Plattformunternehmens stellt die Königsklasse in der digitalen Wirtschaft dar. Es gibt nur eine Handvoll deutscher Unternehmen, die auf globaler Ebene hierbei erfolgreich sind. Das Unternehmen FlixBus zählt dazu. 

Am 10. Dezember hält Daniel Krauss, CIO & Gründer von #FlixBus, im Rahmen der Veranstaltung "Entrepreneurship in der digitalen Wirtschaft" einen virtuellen Vortrag und teilt dort seine Erfahrungen und Einblicke mit den Zuhörenden.

Bitte schreiben Sie eine Mail an Prof. Dr. Christian Scheiner (christian.scheiner@uni-luebeck.de) falls Sie Interesse an einer Teilnahme haben.

Datum: 10. Dezember 2020
Zeit: 13:30 - 15:30 Uhr
Ort: Online

Kiel Institute Research Seminar: The political economy of the Italian Railway Expansion, 1879-1890

Speaker: Giovanni Facchini (University of Nottingham)

December 15, 12.30 -13.30

 

Abstract:

This paper studies the role played by politics in shaping of the Italian railway network, and its impact on long-run growth patterns. Examining a large state-planned railway expansion that took place during the second half of the 19th century in a recently unified country, we first study how both national and local political processes shaped the planned railway construction. Exploiting close elections, we show that a state-funded railway line is more likely to be planned for construction where the local representative is aligned with the government. Furthermore, our analysis indicates that the actual path followed by the railways was shaped by local pork-barrelling, with towns supporting elected candidates more likely to see a railway crossing their territory. Finally, we explore the long-run effects of the network on economic development. Employing population censuses for the entire 20th century, we show that politics at a critical juncture played a key role in explaining the long-run evolution of local economies.

 

Online via GoToMeeting
If interested, please send an Email to frank.bickenbach@ifw-kiel.de to receive a GoToMeeting link to the seminar

Research Seminar homepage: Research Seminar (ifw-kiel.de)

Vortrag "Culture-powered Innovation - Work @ Google

Grafik zum Vortrag Culture-powered Innovation - Work @ Google

Vortrag am 13. Januar 2021 zum Thema "Culture-powered Innovation - Work @ Google" von Frank Stecher (Performance Agency Lead, Google). 

Bitte schreiben Sie eine Mail an Prof. Dr. Christian Scheiner (christian.scheiner@uni-luebeck.de) falls Sie Interesse an einer Teilnahme haben.