Gastvorlesungen und Workshops

Trade Shocks, Labour Markets and Elections in the First Globalization

KCG Lunch Time Seminar:
Speaker:
Felix Kersting (HU Berlin)
Time and Date: Friday, March 12, 2021, 12:00 – 13:00

Abstract:

We study the “grain invasion” of the first globalization (1880-1913) as a historical counterpart to today’s China shock. We show that trade shocks in agriculture depressed rural counties in Prussia. However, we do not find the decline in income per capita and the political polarization that studies find for today’s trade shock. Instead, workers left affected counties in large numbers. Our results suggest that the negative and persistent effects of trade shocks we see today are not a universal feature of trade integration, but depend on labor mobility, too. For our analysis, we combine data from three industrial and agricultural censuses on the county level with national trade data at the product level. For causal identification, we instrument German trade exposure with trade exposure for Italy.

Further information:

Online Seminar
If interested, please send an Email to 
kcg-conference@ifw-kiel.de to receive an access link to the seminar.
KCG Lunch Time Seminar webpage: 
https://www.kcg-kiel.org/kcg-research-seminar-2021/

Do Scientists Tell the Truth? Global Experimental Evidence

Kiel Institute Research Seminar:
Speaker: Menusch Khadjavi (Kiel Institute and  Free University Amsterdam)
Time and Date: Tuesday, March 9, 12.30 -13.30h

Abstract:

Academic honesty is crucial for the advancement of and trust in science. Meanwhile, there are concerns around a so-called replication crisis and survey evidence reveals non-negligible questionable research practices. Motivated by identity economics theory, we provide evidence on scientists’ truth-telling by means of two online experiments. We employ an established coin-tossing task with more than 1,300 scientists, in which scientists face a trade-off between monetary incentives for lying and honest reporting. Specifically, we compare reporting behavior between two treatments, either making the private or professional identity salient. In Experiment I with 437 mostly European and North American marine scientists, we find that fewer scientists over-report winning tail tosses in the professional identity treatment. In Experiment II with 864 scientists from diverse academic disciplines and world regions, we find heterogeneous effects across groups and do not replicate the main result from Experiment I invariably. While we replicate the effect for North American scientists, we find the opposite for Southern European and East Asian scientists. Our data significantly correlates with existing country-specific (dis)honesty data. Our findings highlights the importance of professional and societal honesty norms to curb misconduct.

Further information:

Online via GoToMeeting
If interested, please send an Email to 
frank.bickenbach@ifw-kiel.de to receive a GoToMeeting link to the seminar
Research Seminar homepage: 
Research Seminar (ifw-kiel.de)

Jumpstarting an international currency

Kiel Institute Research Seminar:
Speaker: Saleem Bahaj (Bank of England)

Time and Date: Tuesday, February 23, 12.30 -13.30h

Abstract:

Monetary and financial policies that lower the cost of credit for working capital in a currency outside of its country can provide the impetus for that currency to be used in international trade. This paper shows this in theory, by exploring the complementarity in the currency used for financing working capital and the currency used for invoicing sales. Financial policies by a central bank can jump-start the use of its currency outside a country’s borders. In the data, the creation of 38 swap lines by the People’s Bank of China between 2009 and 2018 provides a test of the theory. Signing a swap line with a country is significantly associated with increases in the use of the RMB in payments to and from that country in the following months.

Further information:

Online via GoToMeeting
If interested, please send an Email to 
frank.bickenbach@ifw-kiel.de to receive a GoToMeeting link to the seminar
Research Seminar homepage: 
Research Seminar (ifw-kiel.de)

Tough bargains: When cooperation is more competitive than competition

Kiel Institute Research Seminar:
Speaker: Joachim Henkel (Technical University of Munich)

Time and Date: Tuesday, February 16, 12.30 -13.30h
Abstract:

Economic agents frequently take long-term actions, regarding for instance investments in cost reduction or R&D, before engaging in more short-term interactions, e.g. through price setting. Those short-term interactions may be noncooperative as for example competition on a consumer market, or cooperative and based on negotiations. With cooperation, agents generally achieve the collectively optimal outcome, conditional on the long-term actions taken earlier, since they can agree on and contractually fix their actions. The preceding long-term decisions, however, are typically not subject to joint optimization. This raises the question of how they differ if players anticipate cooperation compared to the case that they anticipate competition. Can it happen that agents prepare more aggressively for cooperation than for competition, and thus destroy some of the value they create through cooperation? And if so, under what conditions? To address these questions, I analyze two-stage duopoly games in which agents move noncooperatively in Stage 1, followed by either noncooperative or cooperative moves in Stage 2. In the latter case, a biform game, agents bargain in Stage 2 over how to divide the joint payoff. I show that Stage-1 actions can be more competitive in preparation of cooperation than in preparation of noncooperative interaction, in the sense of deviating more from the benchmark of full collusion in both stages, and derive conditions for this to be the case. For instance, duopolists selling substitutive goods in price competition invest more in cost reduction when preparing for cooperation than when preparing for price competition. Such increased investments can be wasteful for the duopolists and for society. My results also suggest that economic actors should pay attention to the pre-negotiation phase when arranging cooperation talks.

Further information:

Online via GoToMeeting
If interested, please send an Email to 
frank.bickenbach@ifw-kiel.de to receive a GoToMeeting link to the seminar

Research Seminar homepage: Research Seminar (ifw-kiel.de)

Covert Racism in Economics

Kiel Institute Research Seminar:
Speaker: 
John Komlos (University of Munich, Professor Emeritus)
Time and Date:  Tuesday, February 9, 16.00 -17.00
Abstract:

The mainstream economic theory is replete with implications that feed into structural racism inasmuch as it has the unintended consequence of severely disadvantaging people at the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum which in the U.S. includes a disproportionate number of Hispanics, Indigenous people, and those whose ancestors were slaves. Economic theory thereby provides justification for preserving the status quo and thereby becomes covertly racist because the assumptions upon which it rests handicaps minorities. For example, the canon assumes that information is free, whereas it is not, and costly information implies that its acquisition by poor people requires a greater share of their income, making it more difficult for them to make well-informed decisions. Because of inferior schooling opportunities, the poor are more exposed to the myriad of problems associated with bounded rationality and have difficulties avoiding the traps set for them in small print. That tastes are assumed to be exogenous is hardly a benign oversight, because people enter the market as children; so, unfettered markets have a long time to impact their character. This has a harsh effect especially on poor children since they are particularly vulnerable to influence through advertisements. Opportunistic behavior means that people with better information can take advantage of others in an immoral, unprincipled, cunning, crafty, or deceptive manner. Because of less information at their disposal and because of inferior schooling, minorities are more exposed to the vagaries of unscrupulous and powerful megacorporations that often leads to exploitation. Conventional economic theory, in the main, ignores these crucial issues and instead theorizes about an Alice-in-Wonderland economy inhabited by supermen and superwomen who know everything about everything, are perfectly rational, develop their tastes autonomously, can maximize their welfare, have perfect foresight, and avoid falling prey to opportunists around them. Hence, mainstream economists provide succor for the maintenance of the status quo which tilts the lever of opportunities away from minorities and supports systemic racism as a consequence.

Further information:

Online via GoToMeeting
If interested, please send an Email to 
frank.bickenbach@ifw-kiel.de to receive a GoToMeeting link to the seminar
Research Seminar homepage: 
Research Seminar (ifw-kiel.de)

A Quantitative Analysis of the Terms-of-Trade Theory

Kiel Institute Research Seminar:
Speaker:
 Marcos Ritel (Kühne Logistics University – KLU)
Time and Date:  Tuesday, February 2, 12.30 -13.30
Abstract:

I evaluate whether predictions of the terms-of-trade theory, the leading argument in Economics on the formation of trade treaties, are consistent with the data. The theory says that trade agreements help governments internalize a terms-of-trade externality that arises from exploiting market power. I ask what import tariffs countries would choose if they set trade policy exclusively with this purpose. Motivated by empirical evidence on tariffs, I pursue this goal in the context of a quantitative gravity model that captures non-cooperative and partially cooperative behavior among countries in a theory-consistent way. I check whether its predictions can be brought in line with observed tariffs of members and non-members of the World Trade Organization.

Further information:

Online via GoToMeeting
If interested, please send an Email to 
frank.bickenbach@ifw-kiel.de to receive a GoToMeeting link to the seminar
Research Seminar homepage: 
Research Seminar (ifw-kiel.de)

Dienstag, 26.01. Veranstaltung des Marketing-Club Schleswig-Holstein - Marketing-Impulse

Datum: Di, 26.01.2021

Zoom-Meeting

Marketing-Impulse ist eine gemeinsame Veranstaltung des Marketing-Clubs Schleswig-Holstein mit verschiedenen Instituten der marketingrelevanten Hochschulen des Landes Schleswig-Holstein. In der Veranstaltung werden aktuelle Marketing-Forschungsschwerpunkte sowie deren Relevanz für die Praxis diskutiert. Junge Wissenschaftler erhalten die Möglichkeit, ihre Arbeiten zu präsentieren - die Professor:innen erweitern die Diskussionsebene. Co-Veranstalter ist in diesem Jahr die CAU Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel.

18:00 Uhr Begrüßung

Prof. Dr. Stefan Hoffmann (CAU Kiel)

18:10 Uhr Warum Animosität Kund:innen vom Kaufen abhält

Frau Tinka Krüger, Mitarbeiterin der Professur für Marketing (Prof. Dr. Stefan Hoffmann) der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel

18:40 Uhr Einfluss des Umweltbewusstseins auf das Flugverhalten junger Erwachsener

Frau Marilena Schmitz, Studentin an Professur für Unternehmenskommunikation (Prof. Dr. Petra Dickel) der Fachhochschule Kiel

19:10 Uhr Konsumentenreaktionen auf Maßnahmen des Lebensmitteleinzelhandels in Zeiten der Corona-Pandemie

Frau Jessica Urdahl, Studentin an der Professur für A&F Marketing - Consumer Psychology (Prof. Dr. Ulrich Orth) der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel

 

Die Veranstaltung ist für Studierende und Mitarbeiter:innen der CAU Kiel und FH Kiel geöffnet. Unter folgendem Link können Sie teilnehmen: https://uni-kiel.zoom.us/j/81932361839?pwd=Yk9Lc1JjZk54L2I5VGYzTm8xNVdadz09

Siehe auch: https://www.marketingclub-sh.de/aktuell/termine/2021-01-26-marketing-impulse

Provision of public goods via unilateral but mutually conditional commitments - mechanism, equilibria, and learning

Monday, January 11th, we will welcome the first speaker in 2021 in our Erich-Schneider-Seminar

Speaker: Jobst Heitzig (PIK)

Time: 04:15 PM

Considering that players may be unable to write binding agreements but may make binding unilateral commitments that are conditonal on other´s actions, we study a mechanism based on conditional commitiment functions (CCFs). If players must choose their CCFs once and simultaneously, the mechanism contributes to the Nash program since its strong (or coaliton-proof) equilibria realize precisely the core outcomes of the corresponding bargaining problem. If players can communicate, the outcome can thus be expected to be Pareto-efficient. Even without communication, the core outcomes may be found by simple individual learning rules. We motivate the idea in a Cournot duopoly and a public good problem and then derive our results in a very general decision-theoretic framework and give further examples from different areas of economics. 
 

Ref.: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3449004

 

Please use this link to participate via Zoom: https://uni-kiel.zoom.us/j/86854483127

 

Workshop Launch der timebook App

Wir freuen uns, einen Workshop für unsere Studierenden im BWL-Masterstudium ankündigen zu können, um Einblicke in die Unternehmenspraxis zu gewinnen. Im Frühjahr soll die Timebook-App in Kiel gelaucht werden. In einem zweistündigen Workshop können Sie mehr über die Planung erfahren und sich einbringen (Themen: Zielgruppen-Analyse, Launch-Kommunikation, Guerilla-Marketing). Als Termine sind bislang Do, 14.01.2021 und Do, 21.01.2021 um 18:00 Uhr geplant.

Weitere Informationen zum Workshop und zur Anmeldung, erhalten Sie bei Interesse von Prof. Hoffmann (stefan.hoffmann@bwl.uni-kiel.de). Viel Spaß und gute Erfahrungen mit diesem Workshop!

Vortrag "Culture-powered Innovation - Work @ Google

Grafik zum Vortrag Culture-powered Innovation - Work @ Google

Vortrag am 13. Januar 2021 zum Thema "Culture-powered Innovation - Work @ Google" von Frank Stecher (Performance Agency Lead, Google). 

Bitte schreiben Sie eine Mail an Prof. Dr. Christian Scheiner (christian.scheiner@uni-luebeck.de) falls Sie Interesse an einer Teilnahme haben.